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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to explore the growing financialisation of the pharmaceutical industry from the 
beginning of the 1990s onwards and to consider its implications.  It examines a number of features that 
demonstrate the increasing influence of the financial sector on the industry, including changing patterns 
of shareholder ownership, the importance attached to the idea of maximising shareholder value, the pay 
and share options given to company chief executives and other senior managers, the use of share 
buybacks, the increase in the outsourcing of manufacturing, and of research and development, along with 
the growing use of mergers and acquisitions and of borrowing to fund them.  The paper examines data in 
relation to each of these areas in turn in order to provide evidence of the growing financialisation of the 
industry and to highlight some of its consequences for the industry’s task of developing medicines that 
enhance population health.   
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The concept of financialisation has been used by a wide range of social scientists over the last twenty 
years or so to refer to the growing importance of finance capital in western societies since the early 1980s 
and the associated shift from ‘industrial capitalism’ to ‘finance capitalism’ – a form of capitalism in 
which the financial sector has become dominant in the economy and also influences social and political 
areas of life (van der Zwan 2014) – a shift closely linked to the growth of the ideology of neoliberalism 
and its support for free market capitalism (Palley 2013).  While the precise definition and value of the 
concept of financialisation has been contested (Roberts 2018), Epstein gives this oft-quoted definition: 
“financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and 
financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies” (2005:3).  Evidence 
shows that since 1980 the financial sector, which includes not only retail and commercial banks, but asset 
management firms, venture capitalists and hedge funds, as well as insurance companies and pension 
funds, has increased rapidly in size (Greenwood and Scharfstein 2013). 
The majority of authors, while usually recognising that the financial sector has a useful role in the 
functioning of markets, for instance facilitating access to credit, nonetheless view financialisation as 
having largely negative consequences.  On the one hand, they argue that it has adverse implications for 
the distribution of wealth, increasing social inequality by paying high rewards to those engaged in 
financial activities, whilst reducing the money going to wage earners.   On the other, they contend that the 
growing involvement of the financial sector changes business practices, including encouraging short-
termism and reducing companies’ investment, including in research and development (R&D), thereby 
making them less productive – negative consequences visible, as will be clear, in the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
This paper seeks both to explore the increasing financialisation of the pharmaceutical industry over recent 
decades and to examine some of its  implications for the work it carries out and those affected by it – in 
particular its vital and sometimes very successful task of developing  medicines that enhance population 
health.    
Palley argues that there are three different conduits for financialisation: “changes in the structure and 
operation of financial markets, changes in the behaviour of nonfinancial corporations, and changes in 
economic policy” (2007:2).  The focus of this paper is principally on the second conduit – the non-
financial corporations that together constitute the pharmaceutical industry.   But there is also some 
consideration of the third – changes in economic policy that are particularly relevant to the industry’s 
practices. 
What aspects of pharmaceutical companies should be considered in order to explore the growing 
financialisation of the industry and its consequences?    First, there is a set of interrelated issues relating to 
the changing character of shareholding in pharmaceutical companies, the increasing importance attached 
to maximising shareholder value, the changes in pay packages for senior management, and the growing 
role of share awards and options, as well as the use of share buybacks – areas where the role of the 
financial sector has become more prominent.  
Second, there is a set of issues concerning pharmaceutical companies’ increasing use and importance of 
mergers and acquisitions, the reasons for them, and their financing. Financial institutions are now usually 
at the centre of mergers and acquisitions, an important source of their income, providing financial advice 
at considerable expense, carrying out due diligence on the target company, and helping to secure large 
amounts of credit from banks, asset management companies, or venture capitalists that is necessary to 
finance the merger or acquisition.   One consequence of these changes, as mentioned, is that fewer 
resources (money and time) are available for investment in the productive activity of the company, such 
as in-house R&D. Instead of profits being retained and reinvested in the company to the benefit of 
population health, they are often used for unproductive financial activities that benefit senior managers,  
shareholders and the financial sector.   
In exploring these issues the paper  primarily focuses on the top fifteen pharmaceutical companies – a 
listing that changes quite rapidly over time, not least because  of ongoing mergers and acquisitions.   
Table 1 lists the top fifteen companies in 2017 ranked by a formula giving greatest weight to 
pharmaceutical sales (40%), but also some weight to factors such as the growth in pharmaceutical 
revenues and the proportion of revenue from their top three pharmaceutical products.  The importance of 
the top companies to the industry as a whole is indicated by the fact that together the top ten accounted for 
around 40 per cent of the global pharmaceutical market (ibid).  Indeed the industry is often described as 
an oligopoly (Galambos 2000). 







Pharma Sales  
($ millions) 
Pharma sales as 
% of all sales 
1 Pfizer US 52,824 100 
2 Merck & Co US 35,151 88 
3 Johnson & Johnson US 33,464 47 
4 Hoffman la Roche Switzerland 39,494 77 
5 Sanofi France 35,850 100 
6 Novartis Switzerland 32,562 67 
7 AbbVie US 25,638 100 
8 AstraZeneca UK 23,002 100 
9 Gilead Sciences US 29,953 99 
10 Amgen US 22,991 100 
11 Bristol-Myers Squibb US 19,427 100 
12 Teva Israel 21,903 100 
13 Bayer Germany 17,241 35 
14 Eli Lilly US 18,064 85 
15 GlaxoSmithKline  UK 19,969 59 
Source: IgeaHub 2018 
The companies listed all operate globally.  Some, like Pfizer, Merck, Johnson & Johnson, and Eli Lilly, 
are long-established American companies, making their sales revenue mainly from patented drugs.  In 
contrast Teva, based in Israel, focuses primarily on generics – drugs neither patented nor branded – while 
Gilead Sciences and Amgen, two US-based companies founded only in the 1980s, developed as 
biotechnology companies whose emergence is discussed below.  And many are the result of mergers 
between long-established pharmaceutical companies. 
Some of the top companies, as Table 1 shows, make a considerable proportion of their sales from over-
the-counter consumer products, such as toothpaste, health drinks, skin creams, and shampoo .   Indeed,  
were  companies ranked simply by total sales the ordering would be rather different, with Johnson & 
Johnson topping the list with  total sales of $71,890 million in 2017 but only 47 per cent coming from 
pharmaceutical products.  Bayer, at 35 per cent, had the lowest proportion of total sales from 
pharmaceuticals in 2017.  However, ten of the fifteen had 80 per cent or more their sales revenue from 
pharmaceuticals.  
Methods 
This study draws on a range of documentary sources focusing in particular as a criterion for selection on 
available data on the top fifteen companies.  The key sources are:  
1. Data produced by the finance industry on the top companies listed in Table 1, for instance Nasdaq 
data on shareholdings, and Bloomberg’s profiles of pharmaceutical chief executives 
2. The annual reports and websites of the top-15 pharmaceutical companies. 
3. Press releases from the top pharmaceutical companies, such as those issued when mergers and 
acquisitions involving them occur  
4. Data published by various pharmaceutical-related organisations, such as national and 
international pharmaceutical associations and trade-related publications.  These sources mostly 
provide data on the top companies but also some material relating to the industry as a whole. 
5. Academic articles that include data on the pharmaceutical industry and pharmaceutical 
companies. 
Shareholders, shareholder value, senior managers’ pay and share buybacks 
The increasing financialisation of the pharmaceutical industry can be seen in changes in shareholding, the 
importance attached to shareholder value in decision making, senior managers’ pay packages and the use 
of share buybacks.  To examine these changes it is necessary to look at the industry in its historical 
context.  Many of the oldest pharmaceutical companies were first established in the mid-nineteenth 
century, set up by individuals who began to see opportunities for selling medicines, often formulating 
them by combining available substances in distinctive recipes and giving them brand names, or else they 
were offshoots of the chemical industry.  Typically companies were family businesses that passed down 
between the generations, and by the end of the century had mostly established themselves as legal entities 
(a process known as incorporation).  For instance, Eli Lilly named after, and headed by, its founder, was 
set up as a  business manufacturing medicines in Indianapolis in1876 and incorporated in 1881,  then 
passed to his son and then grandson, and only first headed by a non-family member as late as 1953.   
However, though often already incorporated prior to the Second World War, most of the pharmaceutical 
companies remained in private hands and were not floated on any stock exchange.  It was mostly only 
from the 1940s onwards that they began to become public companies.  For instance, Pfizer, set up in 1849 
in Brooklyn as a small business to make up and sell chemicals for therapeutic purposes, was incorporated 
in 1900, and became a public company in 1942.  Johnson & Johnson, established in New Jersey in 1886 
manufacturing and selling surgical dressings was incorporated the following year, and went public in 
1944, while Glaxo, first established in New Zealand as a general trading company, was incorporated in 
1906 following its success with dried-milk baby products, and went public in 1947.  In contrast Hoffman-
La Roche, set up as a small laboratory in Basel by the father of Fritz Hoffman-La Roche, became a public 
company in 1919, though initially mostly with family members as shareholders, following a series of 
major problems created by the First World War.  And Merck & Co based in New Jersey, after separating 
from its German progenitor in 1917 during the War, incorporated in 1927, and became a public company 
in 1953, and Eli Lilly went public in 1952. 
Becoming a public company was an important step, typically designed to allow the company to raise 
larger amounts of capital to invest in its activities by selling shares to the public.  A public listing could 
also enhance a company’s reputation, yet it also gives shareholders more potential power, and can on 
occasions somewhat constrain the power of company managers, perhaps directing them towards activities 
they might not otherwise have chosen.  Certainly shareholders in return for their share ownership usually 
hope to secure a profit on their investment in the form of a regular dividend and/or a higher price for their 
shares when sold.   
When pharmaceutical companies first went public, as with other companies, shares were still mostly held 
by private individuals, if no longer those personally known to the founders or their successors, data 
showing that in the US from 1900 to 1945 institutional investors held only around 5 per cent of shares in 
publicly-listed companies (Blume and Keim 2012).   However, since then there has been a growth in 
institutional shareholding in publicly-listed companies, and the proportion of shares held by institutions in 
the US had reached 67 per cent by 2010 (ibid).  The evidence also indicates that in the case of large 
corporations the percentage of institutional shareholdings was often higher (ibid).  As one would expect, 
the majority of institutions holding large blocks of shares are financial companies: asset management 
groups, pension funds, venture capital funds, mutual funds, banks, investment management funds, and 
insurance companies. And this applies to pharmaceutical companies as to other companies listed on stock 
exchanges across the world.  
Table 2 shows the three largest shareholders in March 2019 in US pharmaceutical companies included in 
the 2017 top-15 list. Non-US based companies are excluded because their shares are primarily traded on 
other exchanges and no comparable data is available. 
Table 2:   Institutional investors in the top US pharmaceutical companies, March 2019 
Company Institutional 
holdings % 
Largest holding 2nd  largest 3rd largest 
Pfizer 75.1 Vanguard BlackRock State Street 
Merck & Co 76.8 Vanguard BlackRock State Street 
Johnson & Johnson 68.1 Vanguard BlackRock State Street 
AbbVie 70.1 Capital Research Vanguard BlackRock 
Gilead  80.1 BlackRock Vanguard Capital Research 
Amgen 79.3 Vanguard BlackRock  Capital Research 
Bristol Myers Squibb 74.3 Wellington Vanguard BlackRock 
Eli Lilly 79.7 Lilly Endowment Vanguard BlackRock 
Sources: Nasdaq ownership summaries, 25.3.19 
As can be seen, the same institutional investors appear again and again.  Vanguard Group, a Pennsylvania 
investment company, was one of the top three shareholders in all eight of the top US pharmaceutical 
companies, as was the US-based BlackRock, currently the world’s largest asset management company.  
Notably in the case of Eli Lilly, Lilly Endowment, a large private family foundation, held a significant 
proportion of the shares; however the next two largest shareholders were Vanguard and BlackRock. And 
below the largest shareholders come many more financial companies with smaller holdings 
The shift to a situation where financial companies hold the bulk of a company’s shares is a clear indicator 
of the financialisation of the pharmaceutical industry, and is an important means by which the financial 
sector can exercise power over companies, even though the percentage of shares in any company held by 
a leading institutional investor is rarely more than 10 per cent and mostly less.  An institution with a 
significant shareholding  has far more potential influence than a private individual with a far smaller one, 
and the sale of a large shareholding is often treated as a sign that the company is not doing well.  Hence 
threatening to sell shares if the company does not find ways to increase share prices or dividends can be 
an effective way of altering its behaviour.  And while financial institutions such as asset management 
companies often hold shares long term, others such as hedge funds mostly acquire them on a speculative 
short-term basis using credit, moving their money between companies as a result of anticipated 
movements in share prices.  In either case the share price and the dividends paid out become important 
markers of a company’s success. Equally financial companies can use the threat of supporting a takeover 
of the company to encourage compliance to their objectives, or put pressure on a chief executive to stand 
down if they are not satisfied with their performance as, for instance, happened with the chief executive 
of the British AstraZeneca in 2012 (New York Times 2012).  Consequently the chief executives of top 
pharmaceutical companies have in practice less power over decision making than they had thirty or forty 
years ago. 
Financial institutions can, for instance, try and influence the strategic direction of pharmaceutical 
companies, as occurred with GlaxoSmithKline when in 2015 Neil Woodford, a UK investment fund 
manager who had held shares for 15 years, took the company to task (Lobo 2015) for its refusal to 
consider breaking itself up into more specialised units, as had occurred with Abbot Laboratories which 
split off its pharmaceutical business as AbbVie in 2012.  Woodford proceeded to sell his GSK 
shareholding in 2017. However GSK and Pfizer are now in the process of establishing and splitting off a 
joint consumer healthcare business. 
One consequence of such pressures is that the chief executives and other senior managers of 
pharmaceutical companies are encouraged to ensure that both share prices and dividends are kept high.  
Indeed, maximising ‘shareholder value’ has become something of an obsession with the managers of 
major corporations (Lazonick et al 2017). The term itself simply refers to the returns delivered to 
shareholders, though precisely how this is to be measured is a matter of debate (Smith 2015).  A focus on 
shareholder value is particularly encouraged by the growing practice of awarding shares and share options 
as part of the pay packages of senior managers, which means that they have a direct financial interest in 
maximising share prices and dividends.   
Lazonick and colleagues (2017) note the very high percentage of share options and share awards in the 
total compensation paid to chief executives of US pharmaceutical companies included in Standard & 
Poor’s list of the top 500 corporations – making up around 90 per cent of their pay packages over the 
period 2006-17. They also note that the newer biotechnology companies were the first of the 
pharmaceutical companies to start paying exceptionally high remuneration packages to their chief 
executives, pointing to the case of Gilead, whose chief executive was the highest or second highest paid 
pharmaceutical chief executive in the six years from 2009 to 2015 (ibid). Significantly shares are not 
taxed when first acquired, and are taxed at lower rates than salaries. One contributor to the increasing size 
of the financial packages of chief executives and other senior managers has been the growing use of share 
buybacks.  Share buybacks are an important financial device that companies now use, usually in an effort 
to raise the price of shares and dividends When a company buys back shares not only is money for 
dividends divided across fewer shares, raising earnings per share, but it often also pushes up the value of 
the shares on the stock market.  For example, in 2011 following a difficult year in which  the company 
had to settle litigation over a diabetes pill that was pushing down the share price, GSK introduced a share 
buyback programme of £1 to £2 billion that immediately ”cheered investors and lifted GSK shares more 
than 3 per cent” (Hirschler 2011).  The rise in share prices may be short-lived but sufficient for 
individuals and institutions to sell off shares at a considerable profit that is taxed at lower levels than 
salaries.    Until 1982 share buybacks were usually considered illegal and rarely used.  However that year 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission added Rule 10b-18 that authorised the repurchase of shares 
under certain conditions.  Since then their use has markedly increased and their use has spread to many 
other countries.  
Of the eight major leading US pharmaceutical companies included in the 2017 top fifteen list i, two, 
Pfizer and Johnson & Johnson, spent more on dividends and share buybacks than their total net income 
over the period 2006-15, and two, Pfizer and Amgen, spent over 70% of their net income on buybacks 
(Lazonick et al 2017).  Moreover and importantly, companies do not solely fund share buybacks from 
profits, they may also obtain credit to finance them.  Here the tax policy of a country may encourage such 
practices, as in the US, where taxes on profits have been higher than those on interest payments so that 
there has been a direct incentive to borrow rather than to increase profits (Palley 2007).   
The orientation to maximising shareholder value and the use of devices such as share buybacks may also 
have been encouraged by the fact that a significant proportion of the chief executives of the top 
pharmaceutical companies have formal qualifications in business, mainly MBAs, or economics degrees.  
MBAs in particular tended in the final decades of the twentieth century to emphasise the importance of 
maximising shareholder value (Stout 2012; Murray 2013).  Analysis of the qualifications of the chief 
executives of the 2017 top 15 companies in March 2019 shows, five of the fifteen had MBAs and a 
further three economics degrees (Bloomberg Executive Profiles, 2019).  Only seven had degree-level 
education in science, and this is apparently not considered a prerequisite.  
What are the consequences of the focus on share prices, share dividends and share buybacks?   The first, 
previously mentioned, is that companies can become more short-term oriented seeking to maximise 
immediate shareholder returns instead of making investments that look to the long-term health of the 
company (Palley 1997), a short-termism arguably encouraged by, and reflected in, the practice of making 
quarterly financial returns to the public, mandatory in the US since the 1930s and used elsewhere.  In the 
case of pharmaceutical companies trend data indicate that they have been keen to maintain or increase 
dividends over recent years, notwithstanding the 2008 financial crisis. Lazonick and colleagues (2017) 
analysed data on the eighteen US pharmaceutical companies over the period 2006-15 included in the 
Standard and Poor’s top-500 Index in January 2016 and found that over this period they distributed 99 per 
cent of their profits to shareholders, 49 per cent as dividends and 50 per cent as share buybacks.   
A second consequence is that the company may raise the prices of pharmaceutical products to pay for 
costly share buybacks and dividends.  Hence in order to cover their costs companies may need to charge 
high prices for their medicines to push up revenues.  One example is provided by Gilead Sciences which 
acquired the biopharmaceutical company, Pharmasett, in 2012 that was developing a new drug for the 
treatment of hepatitis C.  When put on the market by Gilead the US prices of what had become two drugs 
- Sovaldi and Harvoni – were so high, and far higher than Pharmasett had planned, that a Congressional 
enquiry was set up to investigate (Senate Committee on Finance 2015).   Significantly, the increase in 
Gilead’s revenue resulting from the sales of the two drugs was associated with a markedly increased 
programme of share buybacks (Lazonick et al 2017).  There are also numerous examples of steep price 
rises for drugs already on the market (Angell 2001).  
A third consequence is that where the company orientation is towards revenue maximisation then more 
money is usually spent on marketing and advertising in order to push up sales – what Angell calls ‘the 
hard sell’ (2004:115).   The high level of spending on marketing by pharmaceutical companies has long 
been noted, but there is evidence of increased spending in the US at least over the last two decades.  A 
study by Schwartz and Woloshin (2019) found that US marketing expenditure increased from $17.7 
billion in 1997 to $29.9 billion in 2016.  And while spending on marketing directed at health care 
professionals accounted for the largest share, spending on direct-to-consumer advertising (legal in the US 
since 1985 and made easier by the FDA in 1997) increased significantly.  Such marketing means that the 
prescribing of medicines increases as does the medicalisation of everyday life (Conrad 2007).  
A fourth consequence is that if more money is spent on dividends, share buybacks, managers’ pay and 
marketing, less is available to invest in R&D and the development of new drugs Lazonick et al (2017) 
calculate that share buybacks of the top eighteen US pharmaceutical companies over the years 2006-15 
reached as much as 56 per cent of the companies’ total spending on R&D.  They also note that in the case 
of Gilead almost all their new drugs since the company was founded came from company acquisitions – a 
point discussed further below.  Moreover, exceptionally high salary packages for senior managers and 
spending on dividends and buybacks can increase companies’ indebtedness and its associated costs. 
Fifth, companies oriented to shareholder value can also be especially keen to cut the costs of production 
and manufacturing.  Apart from trying directly to reduce staff within the company  one means of doing 
this, not new to the industry, but that has increased over recent decades, has been the outsourcing of both 
manufacturing and R&D, usually to countries where labour costs are lower.  The former has a rather 
longer history (Miller 2017) than the latter and is more extensive, but  outsourcing of R&D, both basic 
research and clinical trials,  is now occurring quite widely, partly generated by the wish to cut costs but 
also by companies’ lack of success in identifying new drugs (Schuhmacher et al 2016), and is arguably 
more problematic.  Some of this outsourcing is to academic research centres and some to contract 
research organisations, sometimes in the country where the pharmaceutical company has its headquarters; 
sometimes to countries where labour costs are lower.  While such outsourcing can be effective, there are 
also drawbacks.   It can, for instance, lead to the closure of older R&D facilities and the breakup of 
research teams, which can weaken the R&D capability of pharmaceutical companies (Ebnesajjid 2017) 
and may also lead to the loss of jobs in the country where the company has its headquarters.  However, 
the outsourcing of manufacturing, mostly overseas, has not entirely escaped criticism both for the local 
reductions in employment, but also on grounds of safety.  For example, 40 per cent of active 
pharmaceutical ingredients are made up and supplied by companies in China and this is currently a matter 
of some concern since the oversight of such manufacturing is often weaker than in western countries with 
poor record keeping and fewer spot checks, and there have been a number of recent scandals concerning 
products (Hancock and XueQiao 2018).    
Mergers and acquisitions 
The increasing financialisation of the pharmaceutical industry and its consequences can also be seen in 
the changing character of, and importance attached to, mergers and acquisitions in the industry.  It can 
also be seen as a reflection of the spread of neo-liberal ideas across Western countries. There is a long 
tradition of mergers and acquisitions involving pharmaceutical companies.  These can be an important 
means to expand a company and enhance its standing, or they can be used to maintain profit levels, or as a 
defensive strategy to try to ensure survival.   However, from the 1990s onwards they have played a more 
dominant role in the industry, are often larger in scale, take up a large proportion of managers’ time and 
effort, and are associated with a heavy involvement of the financial sector and often increased 
indebtedness.  Prior to the 1990s, mergers and acquisitions in the industry were less frequent (Walton 
2001), mostly small-scale, often financed from the accumulation of cash from profits or sometimes bank 
loans, and overall the financial sector played a smaller role (Andrade et al, 2001).  From the 1990s 
onwards the exchange of shares, along with securing credit and the use of devices such as leveraged 
buyouts, have become more common methods of financing takeovers, and the financial sector has been 
more heavily involved. 
Following the Second World War through to the 1990s mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical 
industry were not only somewhat less frequent, but usually less central to companies’ activities.  In this 
period pharmaceutical companies were becoming increasingly successful, investing heavily in their own 
in-house R&D, establishing laboratories to identify new medicines, mostly by testing chemically-
synthesised small molecules for their therapeutic properties largely on a trial and error basis.  This activity 
was spurred in part by the success of several US pharmaceutical companies in producing penicillin on a 
mass scale during the war (Younkin 2008).  Companies benefited from patenting the processes they 
developed to manufacture penicillin in large quantities, though penicillin itself, first developed by 
academic researchers, was never patented.  Subsequently, while continuing to benefit  significantly from 
government-funded academic research (Kinch 2016), companies were keen to patent the new small 
molecules they synthesised which had therapeutic potential, since patenting provided a monopoly for a 
period of time (20 years from the date of filing for countries signing up to the World Trade Organization’s 
1995 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement) that allowed them to 
charge a higher price if and when, sometime later, the drug came onto the market.   New drugs in the 
early post-war decades included antibiotics such as streptomycin, new psychoactive drugs such as 
chlorpromazine, and in the 1960s various minor tranquillisers like Valium and Librium, as well as the 
first contraceptive pill –approved for menstrual disorders in 1957 by the FDA and then for contraceptive 
use in 1960 and approved in the UK the following year  
Legislation introduced in most western countries in the 1930s meant that many drugs required a medical 
prescription.  As a result companies invested heavily in marketing their products to doctors with  practices 
such as ‘detailing’ – the sending of company representatives to doctors to encourage them to prescribe the 
new medicines – for instance, a practice widely used in the US to encourage the prescription of 
chlorpromazine to treat schizophrenia.  Drugs also had to be approved by a government agency before 
release onto the market, with regulatory regimes strengthened following the thalidomide scandal of the 
early 1960s.  Nonetheless, the industry flourished, and the period from the 1940s through to the mid-
1970s has been described as its golden age when innovation and profitability were high (Malerba and 
Orsenigo 2015).  The top companies derived the bulk of their profits on the back of a few widely-used 
drugs, with some becoming ‘blockbusters’ – now defined as drugs with an annual income of $1 billion or 
more, but earlier more loosely as drugs selling exceptionally well – such as Valium developed by Roche 
in the 1960s and marketed as a treatment for anxiety.  A later drug, and the first to meet the $1 billion-a-
year definition, was Tagamet in 1986 – a treatment for heartburn and stomach acid developed and first 
marketed by Smith, Kline and French, now part of GSK.   
Yet, while a golden age for the companies and many users, there were some disadvantages for the wider 
society.  These included the companies’ heavy reliance on introducing profitable ‘me-toos’ – drugs 
similar to those already available but sufficiently distinct for a patent to be obtained – rather than on 
developing new, more innovative products whose chances of success were much lower (Angell 2004; 
Light and Lexchin 2012) – an issue discussed further below.  They also included the relatively high prices 
charged for patented drugs, especially in the US, as well as the focus on, and heavy promotion of drugs, 
often for preventive purposes, that could be prescribed for long periods of time, sometimes termed drugs 
for life (Dumit 2006), such as statins and drugs for hypertension that generated large profits, along with 
the neglect of medicines for rarer illnesses and those common in poorer countries. There were also other 
business practices that have been widely criticised such as the farming out of testing to poor countries, 
often with lower ethical requirements for such trials, as with the testing of the contraceptive pill on Puerto 
Rican women.  
However in the 1990s the situation of the industry started to change.  In particular the flow of new 
innovative chemically-synthesised medicines slowed down in part because in-house R&D had often 
focused on producing similar drugs to those already on the market rather than more innovative products; 
in part because the links with academic researchers carrying out the blue skies research on which drug 
innovation was often based had sometimes weakened (Cockburn 2004).  Hence there were anxieties about 
the loss of income once the patent of a drug on which the profits of a company depended expired – the so-
called patent cliff – and this prompted a wave of mergers and acquisitions.  Companies wanted to 
maintain their income flow in future years and ensure it did not suddenly dry up once a patent ended, and 
this encouraged them to look to acquire or merge with companies which had new patented medicines in 
the pipeline that had recently secured, or were likely to secure, regulatory approval.   For example, 
Pfizer’s (2002) Press Release about their planned acquisition of Pharmacia not only mentioned the 
number of drugs the two companies had in the pipeline, but also emphasised that whereas the patents of 
Pfizer’s products would mostly expire within the next ten years, those of Pharmacia would last into the 
following decade.   
However, decisions to take the strategic path of spending on mergers and acquisitions, rather than say 
making further, often riskier, investments in their in-house R&D, were almost certainly also influenced by 
the growing importance of the financial sector.   Mergers and acquisitions were actively encouraged by 
the sector since they helped to increase the profits of financial corporations through the large fees charged 
for advising on services such as identifying target companies, assessing their financial standing, and 
making arrangements for any necessary credit, for instance, through leveraged buyouts, or  effecting 
complex share exchanges. Mergers and acquisitions are big business for the financial sector and their 
increasing use across the industry constitutes an important indicator of financialisation, given the major 
role of the financial companies in enabling them.  
Such factors underpinned the mergers and some acquisitions involving the major pharmaceutical 
companies in the 1990s and 2000s. Table 3 lists those occurring between 1989 and 2009, with a number 
of companies appearing more than once. 
Table 3: Mergers and acquisitions of top pharmaceutical companies, 1989-2009 
Date Merger or Acquisition Combined company name 
1989 Bristol-Myers (US) and EJ Squibb (US) Bristol-Myers Squibb 
1993 Kabi Vitrum (Sweden) and Carla Erba (Italy) Pharmacia 
1995 Glaxo (UK) and Burroughs Wellcome (UK) GlaxoWellcome 
1995 Pharmacia (US) and Upjohn (US) Pharmacia and Upjohn 
1996 CIBA (Switzerland) and Sandoz (Switzerland) Novartis 
1999 Astra (Sweden) and Zeneca (Britain)  AstraZeneca 
2000 Hoechst (Germany) and Rhone Poulenc (France) Aventis 
2000 Glaxo Wellcome (UK) and SmithKline Beecham (US) GlaxoSmithKline 
2000 Pfizer (US) and Warner-Lambert (US) Pfizer 
2001  Bristol-Myers Squibb (US) acquires DuPont Pharma (US) Bristol-Myers Squibb 
2003 Pfizer (US) acquires Pharmacia (US) Pfizer 
2006 Bayer (Germany) acquires Schering (Germany) Bayer 
2009 Merck & Co (US) with Schering-Plough (US) Merck & Co 
2009 Pfizer (US) acquires Wyeth (US) Pfizer 
 
Though these mergers and acquisitions might suggest increasing consolidation of the industry, globally 
the total number of pharmaceutical companies with active pipelines was growing,  increasing from 1,198 
in 2001 to  4,323 in 2019 (Pharma Intelligence 2019).  Consequently the share of the top ten companies 
actually fell: 46 per cent in 2000 (Busfield 2003) by 2017 it was, as noted earlier, only 40 per cent.  
However, there is evidence of some consolidation in particular therapeutic areas (General Accountability 
Office 2017).  
From the 2000s onwards, top pharmaceutical companies also engaged in a rather different set of 
acquisitions involving some of the new biotechnology companies that were springing up.  Biotechnology 
companies had been founded from the mid-1970s onwards, with a focus on ‘biologics’ – biological rather 
than chemically-based drugs and medicines – and their character and research direction were rather 
different from those of the existing pharmaceutical companies.   Most were relatively small with a strong 
scientific orientation and had little expertise in sales and marketing, some licensing their products for 
these purposes to the major pharmaceutical companies. 
Biologics, which are derived from naturally occurring biological substances, were not new.  Many early 
medicines were based on natural substances.  Vaccines used for preventive purposes from the end of the 
eighteenth century are biologics, as is insulin, a substance identified in the early 1920s as the key 
treatment for diabetes, and for a long period produced for therapeutic purposes from animals, usually the 
pancreases of pigs.   In contrast however, the new biotechnology companies drew on scientific 
developments in genetics, and their work largely resulted from developments in DNA technology carried 
out by academic researchers at several universities, particularly those in California.   
Of especial importance was the development of recombinant DNA techniques hat combined DNA 
molecules.  This enabled, for instance, the development of human insulin in 1978, one of the original 
successes of Genentech set up in 1976, the first of the new biotechnology companies to be established.  
Another was Biogen founded in Geneva in 1978 and best known for the drug Interferon.  Many new 
biotechnology companies followed, facilitated in part by the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act that allowed US 
companies to retain patent rights from federally-sponsored research – a direct subsidy to them (Kinch 
2016) and a clear indication of the importance of neoliberal economic policy for corporations.  Yet 
another was Amgen established in 1980 that made much of its early profits from the drug Epogen, a 
version of the hormone erythropoietin first isolated by an academic researcher, and then produced using 
recombinant engineering (Goozner 2004) – a firm now one of the top 15 (bio)pharmaceutical companies.  
Yet another was Gilead Sciences founded in 1987, best known for its antiviral Tamiflu, and also now a 
leading company. 
The financial sector has been especially important in the establishment of some of these companies that 
often depended heavily on investment particularly from venture capitalists.  Venture capitalists played an 
active role in the establishment of some of the new companies, as with all four mentioned above – 
Amgen, Biogen, Genentech, and Gilead.  Starting from scratch they needed considerable capital for staff 
and equipment to get the business off the ground. 
The biotechnology companies initially developed as separate companies somewhat outside the framework 
of the pharmaceutical industry, and the products they developed were targeted at very different markets.  
Whereas the ideal drug for the major pharmaceutical companies of the golden era had a very extensive 
market, usually underpinned by long-term use, the new biologics were, after the first successes, often 
targeted at far smaller groups, such as those with relatively rare cancers – a shift facilitated in the US by 
the Orphan Drugs Act of 1983 that increased the tax incentives for work on drugs for rare disorders and 
subsequently permitted fast track approval. Yet by charging exceptionally high prices the drugs could still 
be made very profitable despite the limited markets.  
Indeed, once the achievements of the new biotechnology companies, in terms both of product innovation 
and profitability were apparent, not surprisingly they became the object of takeovers by leading 
pharmaceutical companies. These, after their successes in the decades following the Second World War 
were, as noted, having less success in identifying new medicines with large-scale markets. as one 
company advising on mergers and acquisitions argued:    
 The large, complex organizations of the originators are unsuited to fostering innovation. An 
 ecosystem of venture capital has proven much more effective in selecting early-stage  
biomedical research opportunities.  Essentially, venture capitalists today pre-finance the early-
stage development for pharma companies (Kurmann Partners undated) 
 
The term ‘originators’ refers to the companies first authorised for worldwide marketing of a new 
medicine.  Hence instead of investing more extensively in their own in-house R&D, which had often 
focused on developing me-toos rather than on more innovative medicines or early-stage research, top 
companies increasingly regarded it as cheaper and more effective to take over a biotechnology company, 
or to license in some of their products. For example, Hoffman-La Roche acquired Genentech in 2009 – a 
company in which it already had a significant stake – even though Genentech initially opposed the full 
acquisition (Knowledge@Wharton 2010).  Table 4 lists some of the acquisitions of biotechnology 
companies, mostly US-based, by the leading pharmaceutical companies since 2000, mainly over the 
second decade. 
Table 4: Leading pharmaceutical companies acquisitions of biotechnology companies, 2001-18  
Company Biotech acquisitions  Price $ billion  
Pfizer 2015 Hospira (US) 
2016 Medivation (US) 




Merck & Co 2014 Idenix Pharmaceuticals (US) 
2014 Cubist Pharmaceuticals (US) 
3.9 
8.4 
Johnson & Johnson 2017 Actelion (Switzerland) 30.0 
Hoffman la Roche 2009 Genentech (US) 44.0 
Sanofi 2011 Genzyme (US) 
2018 Ablynx (Belgium) 
0.1 
4.8 
Novartis 2018 AveXis (US) 8.7 
AbbVie 2016 Stemcentrx (US) 
2019 Allergan (Ireland)* 
10.2 
63.0 
AstraZeneca 2007 MedImmune (US) 
2012 Ardea Biosciences (US) 
15.6 
1.3 
Gilead 2011 Pharmasset (US) 11.2 
Amgen 2001 Immunex (US) 
2013 Onyx Pharmaceuticals (US) 
16.0 
10.4 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 2012 Inhibitex (US) 
2012 Amylin Pharmaceuticals (US) 




2015 Flexus (US) 
2019 Celgene (US)* 
1.3 
74.0 
Teva None  
Bayer None  
Eli Lilly 2017 CoLucid (US) 1.0 
GlaxoSmithKline 2012 Human Genome Sciences (US) 3.0 
Note: includes biotechnology acquisitions priced at $1billion or more. 
* Not yet completed 
As Table 4 shows, such acquisitions have been frequent, with all but two of the leading companies 
making them. The acquisitions have been considered necessary because the biotechnology companies 
were proving more committed to, and versatile and creative in, drug innovation than the leading 
pharmaceutical companies.  Yet some of the target companies had not made any profit and were bought 
on the basis of the products under development, some of which failed after the takeover.  Evidence of the 
leading companies’ belief in the value of the new companies as the source of product innovation and 
potential profitability is provided by the fact that some of the major pharmaceutical companies also set up 
their own venture arms to invest in new biotechnology companies across the world (ABPI 2017). One 
result of the acquisitions has been the blurring of the boundaries between the two types of company and 
the increasing use of the term ‘biopharmaceutical’. 
Moreover, alongside these acquisitions, some of the major companies have divested themselves of 
components of their businesses or split up in order to become more specialised and leaner (Gautam and 
Pan 2016), such as selling off animal welfare and consumer product arms – the strategy  that Neil 
Woodford had sought for GSK.  The best-known example is Abbot Laboratories’ division into two 
companies in 2013, Abbott for health care products and AbbVie for pharmaceuticals. Another indicator of 
the growing financialisation of the industry is pharmaceutical companies’ increased use of credit and 
leveraged buyouts in order to finance costly mergers and acquisitions.  For example, one acquisition of a 
pharmaceutical company not listed in Table 3, since neither  was in the 2017 list of top companies, is 
Japanese Takeda’s acquisition of Irish-based Shire Pharmaceuticals in January 2019, which will probably 
put the combined company in the list of leading companies.  In order to finance this $62 billion deal 
Takeda, actually the smaller of the two companies, had to borrow $31 billion from the banks (Du and 
Takahashi 2018). Similarly Teva’s $40.5 billion acquisition of another pharmaceutical company, Actavis 
Generics, from Allergan was largely financed through loans including a $34 billion initial bridging loan 
(Bloomberg 2017).   
Yet while top pharmaceutical companies clearly see mergers and acquisitions as necessary and desirable 
they can have negative consequences.   In the first place it is common for the acquiring company to do 
less well financially than the target company in terms of falls in share price (Andrade et al 2001) and 
credit rating (Neville 2019). Another consequence can be the stifling of innovation with innovation in the 
combined company becomes less dynamic    One study of 65 pharmaceutical mergers looked at 
innovations before and after the event comparing them with companies in similar markets without such 
acquisitions, found that “R&D and patenting within the merged entity decline substantially after a merger, 
compared to the same activity in both companies beforehand” (Haucap and Stiebale 2016:4).  Indeed 
Haucap and Stiebale argue that reducing competition can be a motive for the acquisition.  They also 
suggest that mergers and acquisitions can reduce the innovation of competitors.  Yet, as noted, large 
pharmaceutical companies increasingly rely on the acquisition of smaller companies for product 
innovation, as with Gilead mentioned above.  Comanor and Scherer (2018) contend that one problem is 
that the combined company may try to reduce what they consider the ‘duplication’ of R&D (they give the 
examples of Pfizer’s takeover of Wyeth).  However, they contend that having ‘parallel paths’ of research 
with different individuals trying out different possibilities can be the best means of making technological 
progress.  In contrast Shepherd (2018) argues that the fact that R&D internal to the company is no longer 
the main source of drug innovation is unproblematic, and simply indicates the development of a new 
business model where drug innovation is generated externally.  However, if the acquisition of a company 
stifles innovation then this is highly undesirable. 
Another consequence can be that companies seek to reduce the size of the workforce, often encouraged 
by the need to show cost savings to justify the merger or acquisition and to pay for the borrowing that has 
been necessary.  For example, when Pfizer merged with Wyeth in 2009 – a merger motivated by the 
desire to acquire the statin Lipitor, so far the best-selling drug of all time – the chief executive of Pfizer 
promised to make $4 billion in savings. One means of doing so was to reduce the labour force.  In 2008, 
before the merger Pfizer had 81,800 employees, and Wyeth 47,246, a total of 129,226.   By the end of 
2009 following the merger the combined total had fallen to 116,500, and by the end of 2013, it was only 
77,000, although some of this reduction was due to Pfizer spinning off certain parts of the business.  
Altogether, however, something like 35,000 jobs were lost (Staton 2014).   This may have been good for 
the business, but that would not have been how the majority of the job losses were experienced by those 
involved, and indicates how mergers and acquisitions encouraged by the financial sector can redistribute 
resources away from employees.   Indeed this, combined with the enhanced resources going to top 
managers, can be a source of increased inequality within a country. 
Neoliberal economic policy has played an important role in these developments, as with both the 1980 US 
Bayh-Dole Act that allowed the patenting by commercial companies of substances and processes 
grounded in academic research, and the SEC’s new 1982 rule permitting share buybacks.   
Pharmaceutical companies have benefited in numerous other ways from such policies over the period 
from the 1980s onwards.  Of particular importance was the WTO’s 1995 TRIPS agreement that covers 
matters such as copyright, trademarks and patents, which is widely used to protect intellectual property 
rights across the world including those of pharmaceutical companies.  While patenting is usually justified 
as a way of protecting a company’s investment in a drug, it can be to the detriment of low-income 
countries that cannot afford the prices of the drugs produced by high-income countries, but are prevented 
from producing generic equivalents or the newer biosimilars. The Doha Declaration of 2001 relating 
specifically to public health did, however, allow intellectual property rights to be overridden in some 
cases, permitting compulsory licensing by a government of drugs for certain conditions, such as HIV and  
malaria, and of others in situations of emergency such as the spread of major epidemics. 
In addition, the regulatory approval process for new drugs has been somewhat loosened over this period.  
On the one hand, the increasing internationalisation and the intense lobbying by major pharmaceutical 
companies helped to lower some thresholds for approval (Abraham and Reed 2001; Davis and Abraham 
2013).  On the other, through legislation such as the US 1983 Orphan Drugs Act  it was determined  that 
drugs for rare and life-threatening conditions do not have to have the same level of testing before release 
onto the market  (Kinch 2016).  Such loosening, while usually advantageous for the pharmaceutical 
companies’ revenue, means that individuals prescribed the drugs soon after they are released onto the 
market become guinea pigs and may suffer major adverse consequences. 
Conclusion 
The pharmaceutical industry has been transformed since the beginning of the 1980s.  While its core 
business is still that of producing and selling substances with therapeutic value for the benefit of patients, 
and there continue to be some important successes, the companies now differ considerably in character 
from those in the decades following the Second World War.  The changes in character are linked to 
neoliberal economic policies and an increasing financialisation of the industry, most obviously visible in 
the high proportions of shares in pharmaceutical companies held by major financial companies, but also 
in the business strategies they adopt.  These include changes to the size and character of the financial 
packages paid to senior managers, now typically concentrated on share options and share awards, along 
with the extensive use of share buybacks and increased spending on marketing, all of which take up an 
growing proportion of company expenditure.   They also include the heavy reliance on securing new, 
potentially profitable drugs, via mergers and acquisitions, and in many cases the dependence on 
borrowing with the aid and encouragement of the financial sector to accomplish them.  While some of the 
factors underpinning these business strategies come from within the industry, they are also encouraged 
and supported by the interests of the financial sector, and by the economic policies of governments whose 
neoliberal thinking has facilitated the growth of the financial sector. 
What also becomes clear is some of the negative consequences of this financialisation, not least because 
of the need to cover the costs of dividends, share buybacks, senior managers pay packages, and 
marketing, as well as the various costs of mergers and acquisitions.  The first is the very high prices now 
often charged for new or existing drugs, including those acquired from smaller biotechnology companies. 
This has major implications both for patients and health care systems.  In the US, for instance, this can 
mean the price of a drug is prohibitive even for those individuals with health insurance or covered by 
Medicare or Medicaid given the high level of deductibles, co-payments or co-insurance that can be 
required.  And high drug prices also push up state health care costs.  Second, because of the costs of 
financialisation less money is available to spend on increasing investment in R&D that could generate 
new medicines.  Whilst the leading companies mostly continue to spend significant sums on R&D, the 
main sources of innovation are now to be found in smaller companies.  Moreover, the extensive use of 
mergers and acquisitions can also contribute to declines in drug innovation when the two companies 
merge and so have adverse consequence for patients.  Third, leading companies  also continually engage 
in cost cutting exercises by increasingly outsourcing production, manufacturing, testing and even R&D to 
countries where labour costs are lower.  Whilst this is judged necessary by companies, the consequences 
for those who lose their jobs are very different and along with managers’ large pay packages increases 
inequality.   
Hence while overall he results of financialisation may be positive from the point of view of the companies 
themselves, the senior managers and their shareholders, the consequences for patients, employees and the 
wider society are far more negative.  
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